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I. INTRODUCTION
From 1988 until his untimely death, Fred Zacharias published
approximately ninety articles on legal ethics, the law of lawyering, and
the regulation of law practice.1  Fred tackled a remarkable range of 
topics in the field, but legal ethics codes—their nature, functions, and 
place in the regulatory framework—were an abiding interest.  I shared 
that interest2 as have many others.3  Drawing on Fred’s work, this brief 
* Milton O. Riepe Professor of Law, James E. Rogers College of Law, University of 
Arizona. 
1. My hunch, based on a review of Fred’s publication list, is that he was, over
that period, the most prolific American scholar in the field.
2. See, e.g., Ted Schneyer, How Things Have Changed: Contrasting the Regulatory










   





   








   
  
     




    
 
Article argues that various forces, many of which Fred was among the
first to discuss, have been conspiring for some time to make drafting and
debating legal ethics rules within the American Bar Association (ABA) a
fractious exercise in interest group politics rather than a mark of 
professional solidarity.
To make my point, I look back at one of Fred’s early works, a 1993
article entitled Specificity in Professional Codes: Theory, Practice, and 
the Paradigm of Prosecutorial Ethics.4  Specificity concerns the formal
characteristics of legal ethics codes rather than the substantive values 
they embody.  That topic might seem dry, but the article is intriguing 
because it evidences a clash between idealism and realism in Fred’s
thinking.5  Although both strands of thought were prominent in much of 
Fred’s work,6 the clash between them was never starker than in 
How Things Have Changed]; Ted Schneyer, Professionalism as Bar Politics: The Making of
the Model Rules of Professional Conduct, 14 LAW & SOC. INQUIRY 677 (1989) [hereinafter 
The Making of the Model Rules]; Theodore J. Schneyer, The Model Rules and Problems 
of Code Interpretation and Enforcement, 1980 AM. B. FOUND. RES. J. 939. 
3. Indeed, the subject has been a preoccupation of legal ethics scholars for 
decades.  ABA leaders also continue to treat the Model Rules of Professional Conduct— 
the ABA’s current ethics code—as the primary site for formulating and reconciling
norms of professional conduct.  In 2009, when ABA President Carolyn Lamm created 
the ABA Commission on Ethics 20/20 to conduct a three-year study of potential reforms 
in professional regulation in light of the globalization of law practice, changes in practice 
technology, international trade agreements, and new forms of lawyer regulation abroad,
she indicated that a review of the Model Rules would be a key feature of the project.  See 
James Podgers, Firm Hand for Hard Times, A.B.A. J., Aug. 2009, at 63, 64.  As what
has become the “go-to” site for all manner of norms for regulating law practice, the 
Model Rules now include provisions that have little to do with legal ethics as traditionally
conceived, such as rules on multijurisdictional law practice and choice-of-law rules for lawyer
disciplinary proceedings.  See MODEL RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT R. 5.5 (2010); id. R. 
8.5(b). 
4. Fred C. Zacharias, Specificity in Professional Responsibility Codes: Theory, 
Practice, and the Paradigm of Prosecutorial Ethics, 69 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 223 
(1993). 
5. Other scholars have also generated interesting insights by analyzing the formal 
characteristics of legal ethics rules. See, e.g., Nathan M. Crystal, The Incompleteness of
the Model Rules and the Development of Professional Standards, 52 MERCER L. REV. 
839 (2001); Mary C. Daly, The Dichotomy Between Standards and Rules: A New Way of
Understanding the Differences in Perceptions of Lawyer Codes of Conduct by U.S. and
Foreign Lawyers, 32 VAND. J. TRANSNAT’L L. 1117 (1999); Nancy J. Moore, Mens Rea 
Standards in Lawyer Disciplinary Codes, 23 GEO. J. LEGAL ETHICS 1 (2010). 
6. Fred the realist took considerable pleasure in debunking what he considered
“myths,” “fictions,” or worse in legal ethics regulation. See, e.g., Fred C. Zacharias,
Foreword: The Quest for a Perfect Code 11 GEO. J. LEGAL ETHICS 787 (1998) 
(emphasizing the futility of any quest for the “perfect code” of legal ethics); Fred C. 
Zacharias, The Future Structure and Regulation of Law Practice: Confronting Lies, 
Fictions, and False Paradigms in Legal Ethics Regulation, 44 ARIZ. L. REV. 829 (2002) 
[hereinafter Lies, Fictions, and False Paradigms in Legal Ethics Regulation]; Fred C.
Zacharias, The Myth of Self-Regulation, 93 MINN. L. REV. 1147 (2009).  Yet most of his 
articles were constructive, suggesting reforms that he hoped would improve the regulatory
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Specificity.  There, Fred the idealist offered up an elaborate methodology 
for drafting of legal ethics codes or specific rules in order to achieve
“optimal effect,”7 while Fred the realist slipped in a number of 
subversive “asides” that, taken together, make it clear why, at least in 
modern times, the ABA can hardly be expected to produce ethics rules
in a process that even remotely conforms to Fred’s highly rationalistic 
methodology.  Part II boils that methodology down to two principles that 
cannot do justice to Fred’s nuanced analysis but should suffice to serve 
my limited purposes here.  Part III presents some of Fred’s subversive 
asides.  I conclude by speculating about just how Fred came to write an 
article in which the tensions between his idealism and his realism were
so stark.
II. FRED AS IDEALIST: SPECIFICITY AS A PRIMER ON HOW TO 
DRAFT A LEGAL ETHICS CODE 
Specificity has a four-part structure that reveals the principles at the
heart of Fred’s proposed methodology.8  The first part identifies 
purposes that drafters of ethics rules may and may not appropriately
pursue.9  The second explains what Fred meant by “specificity”10 and 
provides a typology of the degrees of specificity professional rules can
have.11  The third part uses the very general “do-justice” standard that
7. See Zacharias, supra note 4, at 225.  Although Specificity speaks of legal ethics 
codes generally, it focuses, as I will here, on the ABA’s Model Rules of Professional 
Conduct, which the ABA issued in 1983 and which serve as the template for the legal 
ethics codes in force in nearly every state.  The ABA has amended the Model Rules on
several occasions since Specificity appeared, and many state codes have followed suit. 
See Lucian T. Pera, Grading ABA Leadership on Legal Ethics Leadership: State
Adoption of the Revised ABA Model Rules of Professional Conduct, 30 OKLA. CITY U. L. 
REV. 637, 638 (2005).  But the changes do not lessen the value of Fred’s analysis of the 
formal characteristics of ethics rules.
8. See Zacharias, supra note 4, at 225. 
9. See id. 
10. Fred identifies four elements of rule specificity: an absence of vague terms that
defy understanding, ease of determining the operative facts that establish whether a rule 
has been violated, coverage of a relatively narrow range of events or conduct, and the
presence of a mandate for or prohibition against particular acts. See id. at 239–40. 
11. See id.  Fred’s typology or continuum runs from (i) rules that state a general 
axiom such as “lawyers must practice competently”; to (ii) rules that guide a lawyer’s 
decisionmaking by suggesting factors to consider but do not prioritize among those
factors; (iii) rules that prioritize among factors and identify the appropriate conduct for
most circumstances, but recognize the need for some leeway and do not dictate a 
particular course of action across the board; and (iv) rules that dictate or prohibit a 






























appears in a comment to Model Rule 3.8 on prosecutorial ethics12 to 
illustrate how “making rules more or less specific affects the accomplishment
of the drafters’ objectives.”13  And the fourth identifies “the practical 
benefits of analyzing professional rules in specificity terms” and shows
how failing to settle on an ethics rule’s purpose and tie that purpose to 
the appropriate level of rule specificity “leads to poor drafting and a 
muddled debate.”14  From this structure I infer that Fred’s first 
methodological principle is that, before drafting or amending legal ethics 
rules, the drafters must “identify their purpose or, if rules have multiple 
purposes, assign priorities among them.  Only with this foundation can
drafters hope to formulate rules that have an optimal effect.”15  His  
second principle is that rules with the same purpose should generally
share the same position along a continuum running from the general to
the specific. Problems can arise when a rule with a given purpose is not 
stated at the appropriate level of generality or specificity. 
Specificity begins by identifying some purposes that, by Fred’s lights, 
are not—or at least “should not be”—a proper basis for legal ethics
rules, and others that are proper.16  One aim that the ABA Model Rules
officially disavow, and Fred appears to consider improper, is to devise 
ethics rules in a sub rosa effort to recast—rather than reinforce or fill 
gaps in—the constitutional, statutory, and common law of lawyering.17 
He is clearer about the impropriety of devising ethics rules to promote 
the “economic self-interest of the bar.”18  Appropriate aims include
at 244–47 (giving examples).  Thus, the continuum concerns a “particular type of specificity;
namely the extent to which codes identify and designate [i.e., dictate] desired conduct.” 
Id. at 244 n.62. 
12. See  MODEL RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT R. 3.8 cmt. 1 (2010) (“A prosecutor
has the responsibility of a minister of justice and not simply that of an advocate.”).  See 
also  MODEL CODE PROF’L RESPONSIBILITY EC 7-13 (1981) (“The responsibility of a 
public prosecutor differs from that of the usual advocate; his duty is to seek justice, not
merely to convict.”).
13. See Zacharias, supra note 4, at 225. 
14. Id. 
15. Id. at 224–25.  This proposition borders on the tautological because one cannot 
assess whether a rule has an optimal effect without attributing one or more purposes to 
the rule.
16. Id. at 227–32.  However, Fred does not dwell on his distinctions between 
proper and improper purposes. See id. at 262 n.114 (“My analysis considers the effect of 
specificity on a code’s ability to accomplish its purposes, whatever those purposes may
be.”).
17. See id. at 229, 308.  How strongly Fred disapproved of this aim is not entirely 
clear.  He states at one point that whether the bar may properly issue ethics rules in an
effort to “recast” the external law of lawyering “is a normative question beyond [his 
article’s] scope,” id. at 275, but elsewhere he criticizes a briefly successful attempt in 
1990 by proponents of a Model Rules amendment to recast the external law as a move
that “[a]rguably . . . oversteps the bar’s proper role,” id. at 288. 
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defining lawyers’ roles in the legal system; promoting professional
solidarity and cooperation by providing lawyers with norms for dealing
with one another, which in turn helps lawyers coordinate their conduct 
with that of other actors in the legal process; providing a basis for 
sanctioning what lawyers generally agree is professional misconduct;
promoting lawyer introspection by suggesting factors to consider when
exercising discretion; influencing lawyers’ attitudes in hopes of 
indirectly influencing their conduct; and controlling lawyers’ behavior 
through rules that bar or require specific conduct and can be readily 
enforced.19 
At a broader level of generality, Fred refers to two views that all legal 
ethics rules should serve the same function but whose proponents have 
opposing functions in mind.  The first and more “modern” view is that 
ethics rules should be designed, like most legislation, to be legally and 
practically enforceable.20  On this view, ethics codes and code reforms 
would be judged as most statutes are judged—“in political terms and in 
terms of their adequacy as a control mechanism for lawyer behavior.”21 
The second and “more traditional” view is that ethics codes should 
express professional ideals and provide a model for practice, rather than
“enforceable behavioral constraints.”22  On that view, the impact of 
ethics rules on lawyer conduct becomes a “secondary consideration” in
judging their value.23 
19. See id. at 231–32, 241–43, 249. 
20. Id. at 225–26 & nn.7–9 (citing works by proponents of this view, including
Geoffrey C. Hazard, Jr., The Future of Legal Ethics, 100 YALE L.J. 1239, 1240, 1255, 
1279 (1991)).  Professor Hazard argues that there was a shift in ethics codes over the
course of the twentieth century, from fraternal admonitions in the 1908 Canons of Ethics
to provisions designed for legal enforcement in the Model Rules of Professional 
Conduct, a shift that Hazard “apparently favors.”  See Zacharias, supra note 4, at 225 
n.7.  I agree that there has been such a shift.  But I also agree with Fred that this has been 
more a change of emphasis than a complete transformation and that a complete transformation 
would have a considerable downside at a time when the lawyer’s professional identity, 
which is closely linked to shared traditions, is under siege.  See infra notes 24–26 and
accompanying text.  I also disagree with Hazard’s view that the ABA issued the 1908 
Canons with no thought to their becoming positive law.  Some bar leaders at the time 
hoped and expected that the Canons, though vague and moralistic by today’s standards, 
would be adopted as positive law.  See Schneyer, How Things Have Changed, supra note 
2, at 175. 
21. Zacharias, supra note 4, at 226. What Fred meant by judging rules “in political 
terms” is unclear.
22. See id. 
23. Id. Of course “judging” ethics rules entails ex post scrutiny of what has 
















   









Fred’s position is that both of these functions have a legitimate place
in ethics rulemaking.  He insisted, however, that attempting to control 
lawyer behavior through rules that prohibit or require specific conduct
and are designed for effective enforcement is not the only appropriate 
function and that other purposes must also have their due.24  He also 
asserted that the “modern trend” toward code specificity “may go too 
far”25—meaning, presumably, that controlling lawyer behavior through 
highly specific rules may now be receiving undue emphasis and also, 
perhaps, that rules meant to serve other goals are becoming unduly
specific.  Great specificity in ethics rules that have aims other than tight 
control of behavior may be a vice, not a virtue.  For example, a rule 
meant to define a certain role that lawyers play may work best if it
identifies the goals that a lawyer acting in that role should pursue, or 
suggests priorities among certain interests affected by the role, rather 
than specifying just what conduct the role requires or forbids.26 
Finally, although acknowledging that the rather frayed legal community
that now exists “does not share a unified view of the goals of lawyer
regulation,” Fred did not consider the multiplicity of valid purposes that
this implies an obstacle to meeting his drafting principles as long as
drafters can agree on the goal or goal priorities they intend their rules to
serve.27  Fred the idealist was apparently confident enough that this is 
possible that he took the trouble to construct his methodology for 
drafting and debating a new ethics code or revisions of an existing code. 
At one point, he expresses his faith that “[c]ode drafters who learn these 
lessons [that is, grasp his drafting principles] will undoubtedly write 
better, or at least more rational, codes.”28  In his conclusion, he adds that
his methodology “should help participants in the debates to . . . reject the 
invitation to act as legislators in just another political process.”29  This
sense that assessments of existing provisions, such as Fred’s criticisms of the Model 
Rules in Specificity, could at least in principle promote better drafting in the future. 
24. Fred also claims that their multiplicity of legitimate goals distinguishes professional 
ethics codes from the bulk of legislation and administrative regulations, which presumably
have behavior control as their sole aim.  See id. at 232–39.  Here I think he captured a 
profound difference between the lawyer’s traditional conception of professional “self-
regulation” and the perspective of legislators or that of government agencies that regulate
law practice before them.  For an excellent discussion of the difference, see generally
Wibren van der Burg, The Regulation of Professionals: Two Conflicting Perspectives (Erasmus 
Working Paper Series on Jurisprudence and Socio-Legal Studies, Working Paper No. 09-
01, 2009), available at http://ssrn.com/abstract1456422. 
25. Zacharias, supra note 4, at 224. 
26. See id. at 242–43. 
27. See id. at 225. 
28. Id. at 285. 
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optimism, however, is curiously at odds with Fred’s realist observations 
about how legal ethics codes are actually produced.
III. FRED AS REALIST: REASONS TO DOUBT THAT HIS PROPOSED 
METHODOLOGY IS AVAILABLE 
A number of Fred’s observations about the manner in which the ABA 
drafted and debated the original Model Rules and subsequent 
amendments seem to me to supply cogent reasons to doubt that anything 
like Fred’s idealistic methodology has been employed to date or will be 
employed in future projects to amend the Model Rules.  Discussing a 
few of those observations should suffice to make the point.
First, recall the first principle of Fred’s methodology: any proposed
ethics code or part thereof must be approached by the drafting body and 
debate participants with a clear—and shared—understanding of the 
purpose or the prioritized purposes that lie behind it.  I fail to see how a 
recommended methodology that is built on that principle can be 
reconciled with Fred’s skeptical and, in my view, largely accurate
observation that “[h]istorically . . . promulgators of the professional 
codes have never been clear about their overall goals.”30 
Second, as noted earlier, Fred appears to have had serious reservations 
about the propriety of devising legal ethics rules to undermine 
constitutional, statutory, or common law governing law practice, and to 
substitute the bar’s—or a segment of the bar’s—vision of what is 
sometimes called the external law of lawyering should be.31  Yet he
refers to Professor Susan Koniak’s “persuasive case for the proposition 
that many aspects of the [Model Rules] are designed precisely to 
establish lawyers’ own vision of the law of lawyering.”32  Although the
30. Id. at 227 (emphasis added). 
31. See supra note 17. 
32. Zacharias, supra note 4, at 274 & n.151 (citing Susan P. Koniak, The Law 
Between the Bar and the State, 70 N.C. L. REV. 1389, 1417–41 (1992)); see also id. at 
227 n.10 (“After reviewing aspects of professional regulation that are in tension with 
state law, Professor Koniak argues that code drafters . . . have attempted not only to 
supplement substantive law governing lawyers, but also to trump it with their own
vision.”).  My work on the drafting of the original Model Rules found a number of instances
in which language was inserted in an effort to influence courts or administrative agencies,
including one of the original comments to Model Rule 1.6 on the lawyer’s duty of
confidentiality that was clearly meant to influence judges when determining whether the 
duty of confidentiality was overridden by other law.  “Whether another provision of law 
supersedes Rule 1.6 is a matter of interpretation beyond the scope of these Rules,” the 

























ABA does not officially “intend” for the Model Rules to be used in that
way, they exist in an environment that is rich with external law, and it
would be quite naïve to suppose that the many bar constituencies that are 
governed by both the internal and the external law never try to shape the 
Model Rules to influence external law or legal decisionmakers.  The 
incentives to do so are very strong.
Third, although Fred’s idealism put him at pains to distinguish code 
drafters following his principles from “legislators in [the] political
process,”33 he not only points to evidence of “behind-the-scenes political
jockeying” in the Model Rules drafting process34 but also acknowledges
the likely “inevitab[ility]” of specialty groups within the bar lobbying for
and influencing provisions in the Model Rules.35  He refers, for example,
to the political pressure that a criminal-defense-lawyer-dominated ABA 
Criminal Justice Section brought to bear in a successful adoption of a 
model rule requiring prosecutors to obtain judicial approval before they
may subpoena a defense lawyer to give testimony that is not based on 
privileged information but might be adverse to the lawyer’s client.36 
Further evidence that the high degree of specialization—and therefore
fragmentation—that exists in the legal profession today makes it 
unrealistic to suppose that any substantial effort to amend or supplant the 
Model Rules could proceed on the basis of Fred’s recommended 
ideology lies in the fact that many specialty bars have issued nonbinding 
ethical guidelines geared to practice in a particular field.  As Fred has 
observed, some of those guidelines appear to be in tension with the 
Model Rules.37 
IV. CONCLUSION 
Because I share Fred’s realism but not his idealism, I do not find 
especially damning the interest group politics that, as Fred recognized, 
have come to play a major role in the making of the ABA’s legal ethics 
rules.38  My point is simply that the phenomenon is so entrenched that it
RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT R. 1.6 cmt. 20 (2001) (emphasis added).  This language was 
later deleted. See id. R. 1.6 cmt. 12. 
33. See Zacharias, supra note 4, at 309. 
34. See id. at 227 n.11.  My own study of the drafting of the Model Rules between 
1977 and 1983 provides many illustrations of this “jockeying.” See Schneyer, The 
Making of the Model Rules, supra note 2, at 688–725. 
35. See Zacharias, supra note 4, at 233 n.31. 
36. See id. at 289–91 & nn.204 & 207. 
37. See, e.g., Zacharias, Lies, Fictions, and False Paradigms in Legal Ethics 
Regulation, supra note 6, at 841–42 & nn.59–62. 
38. For political analysis of the fractious six-year process in which the ABA produced 
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casts doubt on the viability of Fred’s proposed code-drafting methodology.  
The lingering question is how Fred the realist came to the conclusion 
that the highly rationalistic methodology for drafting rules of legal ethics 
could be adopted.  My only explanation is that Fred was no cynic and
insisted in writing Specificity based on the power of hope over
experience.
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